The ontological deficits of quantum reality by Lapiedra i Civera, Ramon
CONTRIBUTIONS to SCIENCE, 1 (2): 193-197 (1999)
Institut d’Estudis Catalans, Barcelona
FOCUS
The ontological deficits of quantum reality
Ramon Lapiedra*
Departament d’Astronomia i Astrofísica. Universitat de València
Before entering into any deeper philosophical discussions,
our immediate intuition is that our world is comprised of our
own consciousness, with its contents and varying states,
and an outer world that is independent of our conscious-
ness. Take, for example, a table and the image and idea we
have of that table. Let’s say the table is brown. Yet, what is
brown? The table, you reply, which even had it been red or
green would still be a table. This table is also, to a greater or
lesser extent, hard to the touch. So, let’s try again. What is
this hard, brown object? The very table under discussion, at
all times the table, which moreover occupies a given place
and has certain dimensions. The table, that if I close my eyes
disappears from sight, but returns if I open them. This table
is the object of somebody else’s comments, (oh, that memo-
rable meal we had on it one day!) and my expectations
(now, I leave, but when I come back tomorrow, I know I will
find it in the same corner of the room). Yet it seems that this
table, the real table, whatever be the significance of this ass-
esment, is not the brown colour I perceive, nor the tactile
sensation, nor its environment, nor its apparent size in my
eyes, nor the comments I have heard about it, nor the mem-
ory I keep of it, nor the expectations to which it gives rise.
From the beginning, it is none of these, nor can it be ac-
counted for by the most complete series of characteristics
that we might predicate. At the level of our immediate intu-
ition, the table is something which is previous to this and
concerning which we can predicate all the elements in that
complete series. What then is the nature of this enigmatic
previous object, if such a question has any meaning?
Perhaps it is worth pointing out at this point that the set of
sensations, opinions, judgements, memories, expectations,
etc. in relation to the table is endowed with a certain stand-
ing, structural and global existence, which is separable from
the complete set of sensations, opinions, etc.,that constitute
the entirety of our conscious life. For example, we can pre-
dict that, if standing alongside the said table, we reach out a
hand, we will experience a clearly defined tactile sensation-
that of touching the table; if we drum our fingers on its sur-
face we will receive an unmistakeable sound sensation; if we
draw close to the table the image we have of it will grow in
size, and if we move away from it, the table becomes small-
er, etc., etc. So, the set of experiences in relation to the table
has a given structure: This structure, the stable set of specif-
ic experiential interrelations, forms a part of the object
«table». If we were unable to perceive these interrelations, if
the only thing we perceived was an indifferentiated magma
of table-experiences, un-separated in our inner concious-
ness from the rest of our mental experiences, we would be
diagnosed as suffering a clinical madness: a chaos of sen-
sations devoid of the richness of distinction and order that
caracterises our subjective lives. But, this consideration a
part, the claim I am making is that the «stable set of specific
experiential interrelations» forms a part of this object. I could
perhaps take this one step further and argue that the struc-
tured series of table-experiences is the very object under
discussion. Without it, the object no longer exists and after
analysing the object and my perception of it, as we have just
done, nothing additional has appeared. Nevertheless, if
seeking to be coherent with the result of this analysis, one at-
tempts to move forward and to dissolve the object (i.e., the
thing for which we predicated each of the elements in the se-
ries «table») within its structured series, then, it raises in our
inner consciousness the basic intuition that the object exists
independently of ourselves, that behind the above structure
lies something more, without entailing that this supposed re-
ality adds anything new to our experience, nor calls into
question our experience. We might see it as a sort of useless
unattainable ontological patch, to which we cannot, howev-
er, renounce and which perhaps give us a basic reliance on
our inner life.
Quantum mechanics takes the stage
All this is well known and forms part of the history of philoso-
phy, but, as regards our perhaps useless ontological patch,
there does not seem to have been any news during the last
two and half millenia. This takes us up to 1927, the year
when the basic formulation of Quantum Mechanics was
completed. But what does this theory tell us? Let us go back
and see its basic lines [1]:
In Quantum Mechanics all we can know about a physical
system, in a given state, is necessarily included in what is
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known as its wave function, Y, in this state. Let us consider a
measurable property of the system, that is, a magnitude.
Take, for example, energy. Given Y, that is, given the system
in a certain state, measuring a magnitude will provide us with
a number of possible values. In general, Quantum
Mechanics cannot predict with certainty which of these val-
ues will be obtained. The theory merely allows us to identify
the possible results for the measure of the magnitude and the
probability of obtaining any of these values, although in spe-
cial cases it is possible to predict accurately the result of a
given measure. The theory does not allow us to say anything
more about the system, even though we can suppose a com-
plete knowledge of the state, Y, of the system. This means in
practise that we can say even less as frequently our knowl-
edge of Y is incomplete. I should perhaps clarify that, in the
framework of Quantum Mechanics, the impossibility of pre-
dicting with certainty which of a range of possible values will
actually occur, when measuring is undertaken, does not de-
rive from our ignorance concerning the nature of the system
and its state, an ignorance which we could, in principle, cor-
rect. On the contrary, as we have said before, in Quantum
Mechanics, all that we can know about a physical system is
contained in its wave function. This means that if the overall
knowledge of Y, that is the complete knowledge of the sys-
tem and its state, does not allow us to predict when one will
obtain a given result, then this relative indefinition forms part
of the reality, an ontological deficit, and not the avoidable in-
sufficiency of a knowledge provisionally incomplete.
Quantum reality is, therefore, affected by a radical indefi-
nition—the possible results of a measurement—which is set-
tled in favour of one or another at the moment of measure-
ment. It is as if there were a deficit of reality, which is only
compensated for by the act of observation. So it appears
that the observation of the object creates part of the same
reality. Then, the quantum object moves away from this onto-
logical patch; a patch, which, unlike the quantum object, is
unattainable and unchallengeable by experience.
The measure of what is called «spin» in Quantum
Mechanics illustrates the partial creation of which the mea-
surement act is capable. Imagine this spin as being like an
arrow of constant length, with a variable direction according
to the state of the system. More specifically, let us consider a
particle of spin 1/2. In this case, the length of the arrow is 1/2
in a given system of units. Experiments allow us to measure
the projection of this arrow in any direction. Our ordinary in-
tuition tells us that the result of such a measure would be any
value between the two extreme values of 1/2 and –1/2.
These two extreme values would be obtained when the di-
rection measured is the same as direction of the spin, which
is supposed to exist prior to the measurement act. But, this is
not what is observed: the measure of the projection of the
spin in any direction is always either 1/2 or –1/2. Just as if the
measurement act of the projection itself created the ade-
quate direction of spin, spin which previously only partially
existed.
That the measurement act should disturb the quantum
system in a not totally predictable way is the essence of
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. However, in the case of
the measurement of spin, it is not the type of disturbance
which fades the clear edges of the reality: here, the distur-
bance is an act which might be considered as partially cre-
ating the reality. In both cases, the idea of a reality indepen-
dent of the observer breaks down visibly and we are again
faced by what before, and in the title of this paper, we have
called an «ontological deficit of quantum reality».
The well-known experiment conducted on a double slit
provides us with a new stage on which we can see this onto-
logical deficit acted out. Here, a light monochromatic plane
wave is incident on a screen after passing through two con-
venient slits. On the screen one does not observe two bril-
liant images corresponding to the two slits, but rather the
succession of several alternatively bright and dark fringes;
known as the interference pattern. This pattern can be ex-
plained by supposing that light is an extended wave in the
space in which it propagates. The problem is that, when one
tries to explain how the light is absorbed by the screen to
produce the interference pattern, one must imagine light as
being formed by particles known as photons. So, while light
propagates like a wave, it is absorbed as a set of particles.
There is no need to point out that the joint images of wave
and particle are incompatible. Therefore, the only way to
avoid this contradiction is to accept, as does Quantum
Mechanics, that light is neither one thing nor the other. When
one conducts a certain kind of experiment, light behaves like
a wave, and when one conducts another kind of experiment,
it behaves like a particle, since in general the measuring de-
vice forms part of the same quantum reality, and the experi-
mental device used is not the same when one conducts an
experiment in order to exhibit the wave properties of light as
when one wishes to exhibit its particle properties.
Thus, the question might reasonably be raised as if to
whether it would not be more sensible to adopt a radical
point of view and to accept that Quantum Mechanics is not
concerned with the quantum «reality», but only with the re-
sults of measurements. Therefore, the reality of quantum
objects would be reduced to the measurement of their
properties, or more accurately to the results of these mea-
surements [2]: a doctrine similar, in the quantum domain, to
the old philosophical attitude known as «epistemological
idealism», according to which the reality of all things could
be reduced to the corresponding contents of our conscious-
ness. One could even argue that never, in the history of hu-
man thought, has this idealistic thesis found such strong
support as it currently holds in the realm of the microscopic
world because of Quantum Mechanics, as we have just ex-
plained in two well-known cases (the measure of spin and
the double slit experiment). On the other hand, the macro-
scopic epistemological idealism is a somewhat unusual
opinion, even if there is no doubting of its internal logical co-
herence. We will never find either any logical inconsistency
in the case, presented before, of the reduction of the quan-
tum world to the measurements carried out on it. But also in
this case, this reduction quickly leads to a description of this
world and of its knowledge unnecessarily complicated and
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strange, as we see it if we examine the well-known ideal ex-
periment of «Schrödinger’s cat». This imaginary experiment
was described by Schrödinger [3] in 1935 and goes as fol-
lows: inside a sealed cabin there is a cat and a radioactive
atom. When the atom decays it emits a photon which falls
upon a device. Then, a poison is given off, killing the cat.
Here the atom is the quantum system and the cat the mea-
suring apparatus (a truly awful scenario, but such was the
story written, more than 60 years ago). As a given quantum
system in a given state, the atom has its wave function, Y,
which contains all that we know about the atom. This wave
function carries away the radical ontological indefinition of
the atom as a quantum object, that is, the different possible
results in each measurement and, in particular, the two re-
sults: the entire atom and the decaying atom.
Let us now consider an observer inside the cabin who is
studying the cat. As long as the cat is alive, he infers that the
atom remains complete, but as soon as the cat dies he de-
duces that the atom has just decayed. How would an ob-
server outside the cabin, yet knowing its contents, consider
the situation? If we adopt the above reasoning, according to
which the reality of the quantum objects reduces to the re-
sults of the measurements carried out on it, the situation
would be as follows: since the outside observer does not un-
dertake any measurements (the cabin is sealed and so the
observer does not know if the cat is alive or dead), he will as-
sume the atom never decays and consequently the atom, as
a quantum system, finds itself in this sort of indefinite exis-
tence, in that double potentiality, so specifically quantum-
like, entire atom-decayed atom. The two observers, the one
inside and the one outside, see two very different realities:
the former will «see» the indefinite atom, between integrity
and decay, until the cat dies when he will know that the atom
has just decayed. In contrast, for the second observer, the
atom always comprises that indefinition. As in the more gen-
eral case of the ordinary, non-quantum, epistemological ide-
alism, there is no logical contradiction here: it is not the same
observer who sees different and unreconciliable phenome-
na; they are two different observers who see different things
which do not need to be reconciled. All the same, we cannot
deny that we have a particularly cumbersome description, in
its extreme relativism, of quantum reality. It is comparable to
the relativism that allows, in the macroscopic world, and
whitin the best idealistic tradition, to say that the moon exists
for he who looks at it, at the moment that he looks at it, and
that it does not exist for that person who does not look at it,
nor considers it, nor evokes it.
New epistemological idealism, reduced to the field of
quantum reality, excluding the ordinary macroscopic reality,
would find its specific justification in the ontological deficits
we have above commented, which are exclusive of that
quantum reality. But the problem with this new restricted ide-
alism is that it cannot be limited to quantum reality as it also
inevitably encompasses the macroscopic reality. Let us re-
turn to the experience of Schrödinger’s cat and to what the
outside observer «sees». This observer has in front of him a
global physical system comprising the atom and the sealed
cabin with its devices, including the cat. This global system
is a quantum system since part of it (the atom) is quantic.
Now, the outside observer cannot perform any measure-
ments on this system and consequently, for him, the atom
stands indefinitely in that sort of sui generis existence, be-
tween integrity and decay. But the problem is that in this
global system, the destiny of the cat is linked to the state of
the atom. So it is not only that the two observers see the atom
differently, a quantum system (the inside observer sees the
decayed atom, and the outside observer sees the atom con-
cerned with an essential indefinition), but that the two ob-
servers see the cat, a macroscopic system, very differently:
the first observer sees the cat alive or dead, while the sec-
ond always finds the cat in a sort of ambiguous existence
between both possible states, living cat, dead cat, associat-
ed necessarily with both coexisting atom states, standing
atom, decaying atom. Yet, that two different observers see
the same macroscopic object, such as a cat, in such radi-
cally different ways, cannot be accepted unless one as-
sumes the traditional doctrine of epistemological idealism in
the field of the ordinary macroscopic world (actually, an eso-
teric doctrine in spite of its venerable philosophical past).
Furthermore, we cannot ignore the not insignificant question
as to the meaning of a physical cat state, where this cat is
neither alive, nor dead, but in a certain sense both things at
the same time. Needless to say that in real life, cats show a
consoling prosaic nature and they agree without any difficul-
ty to appear before us exclusively alive or dead.
This relativism disappears if we accept that quantum re-
ality is provided with a minimal existence, independent of
our perception. From this realistic point of view, the decay-
ing atom is certainly a partially non-predictive event, but it
happens objectively, whether is observed or not [4]. The
cat lives or dies depending on whether this objective de-
caying has already occurred or not. His life does not de-
pend on the type of observer-inside or outside-considering
the situation.
We cannot reduce quantum reality to the result of the
measurements performed on it if we are not prepared to pay
the enormous price of also reducing the reality of the macro-
scopic world to the mere observation of its properties. Then,
as to whether or not we can postulate an ontological patch,
or a minimal ontological patch, there is not much difference
between quantum reality and ordinary physical reality, since
both realities are closely connected here: the only differ-
ence-and this should be stressed-is that in the case of quan-
tum reality we can speak, in the terms of this paper, of some
serious ontological deficits which are not present in the ordi-
nary reality, as I have sought to explain above.
Realistic theories and Bell’s inequalities
The ontological deficits commented on above, in the same
way as the partial, yet essential, unpredictability, entailed by
Quantum Mechanics, make this theory, among all theories
referring to the natural world, an extreme case of violation of
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our ordinary intuition. This is why, since its creation in the
twenties and even today, various authors have sought to in-
clude Quantum Mechanics in more «complete» theories, the
so-called «realistic» theories [5], which are compatible with
ordinary intuition. In these theories, unpredictability does not
derive from a basic lack of exhaustive causation, but is
rather the banal result of a lack of knowledge of some «hid-
den» variables when attempting to define the state of the
physical system. This is what happens in other fields of clas-
sical Physics, for example, statistical mechanics. It is worth
remembering that no experiment has been described which
contradicts the predictions of Quantum Mechanics.
Quantum Mechanics is, today, one of the best tested basic
theories, with an impressive array of agreements between
theory and experiential evidence. This means that the «real-
istic» theories, alternatives to Quantum Mechanics, need to
account for all these agreements also.
So, in the «realistic» theories and in accordance with our
ordinary intuition the magnitudes of a physical system pre-
exist its measurement, and if in practice the result of a mea-
sure is in part non-predictive, this does not derive from its
non-existence or from a deficit of existence of this magni-
tude or of the physical system as such, but from a partial
lack of knowledge of the state of the system we are measur-
ing. It was the great merit of John S. Bell [6], in 1964, to
clearly state that the statistical predictions of Quantum
Mechanics, on the one hand, and those of «realistic» theo-
ries so-called local theories, on the other, do not always co-
incide. In this way, he shifted the question of epistemologi-
cal realism into the realms of experimental testing, a
remarkable turn of events in the history of philosophical
thought.
We have just used the expression «local theories». Here ,
local theories are those in which the effects of a new physi-
cal action cannot propagate faster than light. Now, it must
be remarked that there are realistic non-local theories which
are able to make the same statistical predictions of Quantum
Mechanics, but, of course, these theories contradict the the-
ory of relativity and the copious experimental evidence
which supports it. So, these non-local theories represent too
high a price to pay in order to overcome the nonintuitive con-
tents of Quantum Mechanics.
Let us then return to the local realistic theories, that are
compatible with the theory of relativity. We will clarify, in one
particular case, one of the above statistical predictions of
the local realistic theories which contradicts certain predic-
tions of Quantum Mechanics.
Let us consider a spinless particle (remember what we
have said before about spin) at rest in the laboratory, which
decays spontaneously in two 1/2 spin particles E and P (E
from «electron» and P from «positron»). Since the original
particle is at rest, both decaying particles will move away
with equal opposed velocities. On the other hand, the spin is
a physical magnitude which is conserved for an isolated
system and our decaying particle is just one of these isolat-
ed systems. Suppose that an attempt is made to measure
the spin of one of the decaying particles, for example, the
measurement of the spin of particle E, in a direction, A; sup-
pose that the result of the measurement is, let us say, 1/2 (re-
member that the result of the measurement of the spin of 1/2
spin particle, in any direction, can only be 1/2 or –1/2). Then,
the measurement of the spin of particle P, in the same direc-
tion A, can only give –1/2, in such a way that the total spin of
both particles, E and P, is always zero. This must be the
case since the spin of the original particle, before decaying,
was zero and, as we have said, spin is conserved for an iso-
lated system.
Now, let us suppose that new decaying processes, simi-
lar in all respects to that we have just described, occur again
and again, that is, in each case a similar new spinless parti-
cle decays in two particles, E and P. For every decaying
process we measure the spin of these two particles, E and P,
in any of three fixed at random directions A, B and C, though
not necessarily the same direction for E as for P. In evident
notation, the possible results of these measures on particles
E and P are A+, A–, B+, B–, C+, C–. Let us now make two ap-
parently inoffensive hypotheses:
a) We assume a realistic point of view and so we assume
that the spin components along directions A, B, and C,
whose components manifest themselves in the experi-
ment, exist previously to their measurement in the form
of a special particle arrangement. In each case, the
special arrangement implicitly contains the corre-
sponding spin components.
b) For every electron-positron pair, after the correspond-
ing decaying, we assume that both measurements of
the spin are practically simultaneous. Then the mea-
surement on the electron cannot affect the measure-
ment on the positron, and vice versa, since, according
to the theory of relativity, there are no physical signals
which propagate instantaneously.
Now, from these two natural hypotheses, one can prove in
an elementary way a well-known inequality, known as Bell’s
inequality, in honour of its discoverer, the physicist John S.
Bell. This inequality can be written in our case as follows [7]:
n(A+B+) ≤ n(A+C+) + n(B+C+)
Here, n(A+B+) is the number of pairs of measurements
where we have found positive both spin components, of the
electron and positron, on the A and B directions, respective-
ly. Every pair of measurements refers to each one of the de-
cay processes under consideration. A similar definition
stands for n(A+C+) and n(B+C+).
Now, our great surprise is this: in spite of the fact that
Bell’s inequality has been deduced from such an evident or
apparently evident hypothesis, the experiment shows that,
according to the predictions of Quantum Mechanics, Bell’s
inequality is violated [8]. Then, in this case, local realistic
theories are not experimentally viable, while Quantum
Mechanics is. So, as much as this theory runs contrary to our
intuition, it seems that its strangeness is the strangeness of
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the same reality. In particular, the lack of exhaustive causa-
tion of the theory is the lack of exhaustive causation in the
physical reality as such. In this way, reality becomes some-
thing more than Laplace’s mechanical world, alien to any
newness and to any real production; a mechanical world
where there is no place for any kind of freedom. Actually, the
world of classical Physics, where the future is determined in
all its details, is much stranger than what is frequently recog-
nised. Were it not for any other reason (but many more could
be cited), given this last consideration, if Quantum
Mechanics did not already exist, it would be necessary to in-
vent it.
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